Brett McGurk is a CNN global affairs analyst who served in senior national security positions under Presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama, Donald Trump and Joe Biden.
CNN
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Following American airstrikes against Iranian nuclear facilities last week, and then the imposition of a ceasefire, it’s time to step back and assess what has changed in the Middle East, and the chances of translating military success into lasting strategic gains.
In a national security crisis, what does not happen can be as important as what does. That is particularly true regarding the recent conflict with Iran. For years, analysts predicted that an American strike into Iran would result in an all-out war in the Middle East, hundreds if not thousands of American casualties, and a ladder of escalation that Tehran might ultimately control through asymmetrical means — such as militias across the region with weapons capable of striking American personnel and positions.
I had thought those claims were exaggerated and a product of Iranian propaganda as much as sound analysis. That’s been especially true in this crisis, which unfolded after a nearly 18-month degradation of Iranian power by Israel in response to Tehran’s fateful decision to join in a war against its rival shortly after Hamas’ attack into Israel on October 7, 2023.
Today, we have not just theories and predictions of Iran’s response to an American attack — but lived experience. And so far, it turns out the pessimists were wrong. Iran responded feebly with a telegraphed and defeated missile attack against a US base in Qatar, which served only to unite the Gulf states in condemnation of Iran. Iran’s militias — from Hezbollah in Lebanon, already degraded after losing its own conflict with Israel last year, to the Iraqi militias under the control of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps — stood down entirely.
Further afield, nobody came to Iran’s assistance. There is a theory in foreign policy circles that an alliance called “CRINK” — China, Russia, Iran, North Korea — might band together in a crisis or conflict with the West. No doubt, this collection of states may form tactical and issue-specific partnerships such as North Korea and Iran supporting Russia in its war against Ukraine.
But when push came to shove in the Middle East, with Iran suffering its greatest military setbacks since its 1979 revolution, these partners were nowhere to be found. China made clear that Iran should not think about shutting the Strait of Hormuz given its reliance on Gulf oil exports, and when Iran’s foreign minister visited Russia amid the crisis, he left with only a benign statement from Moscow calling for de-escalation.
Russia’s assertive strategy in the Middle East, moreover, which began in 2015 with President Vladimir Putin’s decision to decisively back the Assad regime in Syria, is in disarray. Putin made a decent bet that power matters above all in the Middle East, and that by coming to the assistance of Assad, he could translate such an assertion of military might into deeper ties throughout the region, including in Israel and the Gulf states. That plan did not work out.
Today, Assad is gone (now living in Moscow having lost his regime in Damascus), and the Russians are barely hanging on to a presence in the Syrian port city of Tartus. Russia’s fearsome air defense systems, known as S-300s, proved useless and easily destroyed by Israel’s military systems, most of them provided by the United States.
All of that — plus Russia’s war in Ukraine, where it has suffered nearly 1 million military casualties and has never established air superiority over Ukrainian territory, something Israel achieved over Iranian territory in 24 hours — leaves Moscow both unwilling and unable to project power in the Middle East, let alone come to the tangible assistance of Iran.
At bottom, what did not happen in this crisis demonstrates not only the weakness of Iran, but also the brittleness of an anti-Western alliance led by Russia and China.
‘Total intelligence dominance’: Brett McGurk breaks down Israel’s strikes on Iran
Shortly after Hamas attacked Israel on October 7, 2023, I was in the Oval Office during a phone call between President Joe Biden and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu. The Iranian-backed terrorist group Hezbollah had just opened a second front in the north, firing missiles and rockets into northern Israel. Netanyahu provided a blunt assessment of the emerging situation: In the Middle East, if you’re perceived as weak, you’re roadkill.
Weakness breeds aggression, particularly for Israel, which for decades has had to deal with an Iran committed to its destruction. Iran has spent that time supporting terrorist militias like Hezbollah and Hamas to place what was known as a “ring of fire” around Israel, with an aim to steadily pressure and strangle the country. Israel for years had managed and contained these emerging threats, until October 7, 2023.
As I’ve written previously, the October 7 Hamas attack, with its mass slaughter of civilians and taking of hostages, forever changed Israel’s national security doctrine. It will never again accept the presence of Iranian-backed terrorist groups on its borders and — after Tehran’s direct attacks against Israel from Iranian territory in April and October of last year — it will also strike directly into Iran when necessary. This is an entirely new equation in the Middle East, and one that in my view is likely here to stay.
Against that backdrop, what happened over the last two weeks in Iran was a foreseeable consequence of its decision to join in a multifront war against Israel after October 7. Not inevitable, however, was the significant military success of Israel’s campaign.
In a matter of 12 days, Israel eliminated the top echelon of Iran’s military, its leading nuclear scientists, its missile production facilities, and most of its nuclear facilities and sites other than those deeply buried, such as the Fordow enrichment facility or the storage areas of Isfahan. This display of intelligence and military dominance will resonate throughout the Middle East for years to come. Israel is now the dominant military power in the region, a remarkable turn of events from only 20 months ago.
America’s assertion of military power may also carry global implications. The B-2 bombers that struck into Iran were launched from the continental United States and dropped guided munitions that no other country possesses with pinpoint accuracy, down three ventilator shafts — all without requiring a regional platform or base.
Deterrence in global affairs lies through the unique combination of military capabilities together with a perceived will to use them. This assertion of force without then getting bogged down with expanding objectives and unclear aims will be noticed by other world leaders who might now think twice before testing the United States.
Based on everything we know to date, Iran’s nuclear program has been significantly set back. My former colleague Norman Roule, who served as the Iran mission manager for the US intelligence community, told CNN that he believed Tehran’s nuclear program had suffered a “catastrophic blow.” Unfortunately, as intelligence professionals work to comprehensively assess what is left of Iran’s nuclear program, this question has become politicized, with many Republicans seeking to back up Trump’s premature claim that the program was “obliterated,” and many Democrats seeking to prove prematurely that Iran might still be able to quickly reconstitute its program.
On a question like this, patience and caution matter, because even as assessments become more comprehensive, there may never be a “final” or definitive call.
Let me explain.
There are generally three levels of battle damage assessments, or BDAs. The first comes shortly after an operation and is based primarily on imagery that might be available immediately or within about 24 hours. The second adds additional information, such as whether munitions performed as designed, and whether specific aim points were hit. This assessment might also more fully assess overall damage to a target — from light, to moderate, to severe.
The third level is different, and incorporates all sources of information, including signals intelligence, partner assessments and perhaps human sources. That process can take weeks and incorporates the views of multiple departments and agencies.
The situation is even more complicated when assessing a nuclear program, and what Iran might do in response. Compare this situation with a strike targeting a terrorist leader. The assessment in that BDA is ultimately binary: The target is alive, or not. Even a Level 2 BDA might be inconclusive, as destruction of a building or a vehicle cannot guarantee elimination of the target. In a Level 3 BDA, there might be imagery of a body being removed, or limping away, or preparations for a funeral, or reactions from the target’s counterparts.
Still, it’s a binary conclusion — dead or alive.
Assessing a nuclear program, what’s left of it and what might happen next is far different, nonbinary and laden with assumptions. For example, even if, as has been reported, Iran might possess a stockpile of highly enriched uranium, does it still possess the high-power centrifuges required to spin that uranium to weapons grade? And let’s presume it does, are we confident that Iran would make the risky decision to install a cascade of centrifuges and move the uranium as Israel still controls its airspace?
Do we assume this could be done without Israel or the US knowing about it — and then taking further action to destroy the cascade, as President Donal Trump has suggested he’d be prepared to do? Or do we assume that Iran is in such disarray that it’s unlikely to make such a decision, or at least not anytime soon? Or that it’s unlikely to make such a decision under threat of further US and Israeli strikes?
Even in that worst-case BDA assessment of highly enriched uranium combined with a cascade of advanced centrifuges (unlikely, but for sake of argument), there would be more questions: Does Iran still possess industrial equipment to mold uranium metal, necessary for producing a bomb, and if not, how long would that take to reconstitute? And could Iran do so without Israel or the United States noticing and acting against such a step?
Such assessments would be made through a combination of nuclear experts in the intelligence community — such as the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration — and political analysts primarily at CIA who study and aim to predict Iranian decision-making, as well as the National Security Agency with its unique expertise in deciphering signals intelligence, which can often be misleading.
For these reasons, when you hear that Iran might reconstitute its program in “months” or “years,” keep in mind that any such assessment is based on assumptions that may or may not be right, including secondary and tertiary assumptions that may or may not be right, and that the United States and Israel can influence Tehran’s calculations.
Inside the US government over the coming weeks and months, there should be a two-way conversation between the intelligence professionals and national security policymakers to determine what might be left of Iran’s nuclear program, what can and cannot be easily reconstituted, and then what policies might be required to help ensure the most dangerous elements of the program — enrichment and uranium metal — do not resume.
Bottom line: This is not the time for a victory lap, which in the Middle East often comes back to haunt presidents. It’s time for focused and determined follow-through.
The military operation has likely set Iran’s nuclear ambitious back significantly, but turning those tactical military gains into a strategic success will require a diplomatic agreement. It might be as simple as Iran truly living up to its commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, under which all of Iran’s nuclear material and equipment must be declared and made subject to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Or it could mean a more comprehensive deal that forever prohibits Iran from enriching uranium, likely in exchange for some level of sanctions relief and international support for a peaceful nuclear energy program.
The aim should be the latter, and as I explained in my last analysis, the diplomacy here has a built-in deadline timed to the “snapback” of international sanctions, which both France and the UK say they are prepared to do in the event Iran rejects a deal. With the authority to snap back sanctions expiring in October, early September (around our Labor Day) is seen as a deadline for reinstalling the multilateral sanctions on Iran that the Obama-era nuclear deal removed, and that have remained removed until today.
This is a card that Washington can effectively use in coordination with London and Paris to impose a deadline on diplomacy. The longer Iran delays returning to the table, the less time it will have to negotiate a deal to avoid a renewal of sanctions and the possibility of additional military strikes should it choose to reconstitute its enrichment program.
Now is also the moment to secure a ceasefire in Gaza.
An extensive backchannel is ongoing to secure a ceasefire in exchange for the release of at least half the hostages still held by Hamas. Hamas has rejected these offers to date, but with all that’s happened, there is a new sense of optimism that these talks can succeed. Trump himself on Friday predicted a ceasefire within a week. That would be great news, and should be the aim, though I’d predict an outcome may take a bit longer as the dust settles in Iran.
There is also renewed optimism for an expansion of the Abraham Accords as Arab countries take stock of new power equations and may seek to enjoy the fruits of economic and technological cooperation with Israel, which is now viewed as the most advanced and high-tech power in the region.
Over time, such a trend is likely, in my view, but not until Gaza returns to a ceasefire phase and is ultimately resolved. Israel is unlikely able to have its cake and eat it too, as the Gaza conflict remains an acute concern for populations across the region and few Arab leaders would be prepared to take the step toward Israel until they can have confidence that it is winding down altogether.
So, how will this all play out?
There is always a chance that the Iranian regime, now desperate for survival, does all it can to cobble together what’s left of its nuclear program and dash for a bomb. It’s important to protect against such a possibility, but it seems implausible — both with respect to what Iran might be willing and able to do given its setbacks, together with what Israel and the United States might see and stop.
There is also the bullish case, that the American operation sets back Iran’s nuclear ambitions for good and the region is now on the cusp of dramatic and positive events to include expansion of the Abraham Accords, and even a potential unraveling of the theocratic regime in Tehran, a historic change in world affairs.
This version of coming events is equally implausible, as spoilers abound in the Middle East, there are no signs yet of an Iranian regime coming undone, and the system in Tehran will seek over time to regroup and reestablish its control internally.
In my view, however, it is now more likely than not that the United States keeps Iran from seeking to reconstitute its nuclear program, helps secure a ceasefire in Gaza, and opens the pathway for an expansion of the Abraham Accords over time (years, not months).
A senior Middle East official who I’ve gotten to know and trust over many years described this recent period and the degradation of Iran’s power as creating the conditions for a new Middle East: more stable, prosperous, integrated and secure. His question was whether the Trump administration is committed to follow through on what’s been made possible, pursuing diplomacy with the same discipline and skill as seen in the military phase.
We should all hope and encourage the answer to be yes.
